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Abstract Social media platforms have been extensively used during natural
disasters. However, most prior work has lacked focus on studying their us-
age during disasters in the Global South, where Internet access and social
media utilization differs from developing countries. In this paper, we study
how social media was used in the aftermath of the 7.1-magnitude earthquake
that hit Mexico on September 19 of 2017 (known as the #19S earthquake).
We conduct an analysis of how participants utilized social media platforms in
the #19S aftermath. Our research extends investigations of crisis informatics
by: 1) examining how participants used different social media platforms in
the aftermath of a natural disaster in a Global South country; 2) uncovering
how individuals developed their own processes to verify news reports using
an on-the-ground citizen approach; 3) revealing how people developed their
own mechanisms to deal with outdated information. For this, we surveyed 356
people. Additionally, we analyze one month of activity from: Facebook (12,606
posts), Twitter (2,909,109 tweets), Slack (28,782 messages), and GitHub (2,602
commits). This work offers a multi-platform view on user behavior to coordi-
nate relief efforts, reduce the spread of misinformation and deal with obsolete
information which seems to have been essential to help in the coordination
and efficiency of relief efforts. Finally, based on our findings, we make recom-
mendations for technology design to improve the effectiveness of social media
use during crisis response efforts and mitigate the spread of misinformation
across social media platforms.
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1 Introduction
Social media platforms have transformed how people communicate after a
natural disaster [59,20,27]. The information that people share on social media
in the aftermath of a natural disaster can be extremely helpful for emergency
response teams to identify urgent needs, plan relief efforts and immediately
identify affected areas [82]. To comprehend this new phenomenon, researchers
have begun to study how people utilize social media to collaborate towards
a common cause during crisis events [72]. For instance, prior work identified
that people use social media to collectively understand crisis events as they
unfold [6], filter and classify the content that is shared on social media [83,1,
8], and handle information overload [2].
Social computing platforms (i.e. Facebook, Twitter) give ordinary people
the capacity of gathering information to aid on-the-ground emergency response
[50], ease the coordination and communication between victims and rescuers
[58,39], help people to organize fundraisers [47], or even rescue lost pets [78].
Social media has even influenced the way governments engage with citizens in
the aftermath of a disaster [14]. However, few research has been done from a
multi-platform perspective. This perspective is important to comprehend how
social media relate to each other in a crisis context [20].
Most prior work has focused primarily on studying natural disasters and
social media usage in the US [59]. The few papers that do study multi-platform
use and crisis response in other regions have generally been done from a quali-
tative perspective [80]. Many questions remain surrounding how and why peo-
ple use multiple social media platforms during a disaster. We especially still
have a limited understanding of how social media platforms are used in regions
where digital and offline volunteers are needed the most, such as developing
countries where response groups have limited resources.
This paper addresses this gap by studying at scale how the general public
used different social media platforms in the aftermath of a natural disaster. We
focus on the analysis of how social media was used during the 7.1-magnitude
earthquake that hit Mexico on September 19 of 2017, leaving 6,000 injured
and 370 killed. The event is often referred to by its hashtag: #19S. Notice
that it is challenging to study people’s online behavior in the aftermath of a
natural disaster because it is difficult to track at scale how specific individuals
used multiple social media platforms. To overcome this challenge, we follow
an approach similar to [79], where we conduct a multi-level analysis at three
levels: at the micro-level in which we zoom-in through a survey study and
targeted content analysis to understand in detail which social media platforms
participants used, why they decided to use them, and how they operated across
them. Using temporal charts of volumes of information over time we transition
to the meso-level, unpacking how information was assembled the days after
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the #19S earthquake. This level allows us to see how information was being
generated. At the macro-level, we zoom-out using network representations and
descriptive statistics to obtain a more general picture of how the general public
used at scale the different social media platforms in the #19S aftermath. The
macro-level allows us to reveal the structure of the information space that takes
in the different social platforms analyzed and uncover the broader patterns of
information flow.
Through our analyses, we found that the reasons participants used mul-
tiple social computing platforms were for: 1) reading, sharing and verifying
news reports; 2) sharing needs; 3) receiving updates from friends and fam-
ily; 4) donating money; 5) building technology; 6) performing data analysis;
7) connecting strangers; and 8) mobilizing people offline. We identified that
participants developed mechanisms for verifying information across platforms
and ensuring the information that flowed on social media was relevant. Our
macro-level analysis revealed that the information most reshared on Twitter
came from organizations that were sharing and verifying news; while on Face-
book it came from ordinary people who created Facebook Groups and pages
focused on connecting strangers to help them find their missing pets.
Our work extends the literature of crisis response in the Global South
by: 1) examining how participants used different social media platforms in
the aftermath of a natural disaster in a Global South country; 2) uncovering
how individuals developed their own processes to verify news reports using
an on-the-ground citizen approach; 3) revealing how people were able to de-
velop their own mechanisms to overcome the problem of dealing with outdated
information. We believe our findings can help inform designers who wish to
create tools to coordinate collective action across different social media sites,
powering tools not only for disaster response but also for a range of other
endeavors.
2 Background on Mexico’s September 19th Earthquake
2.1 The #19S Earthquake
On Tuesday, September 19 of 2017, at 13:14 CDT, the #19S Earthquake struck
south of the city of Puebla de Zaragoza, in the state of Puebla, in the southern
part of Mexico. Due to the location of the Epicenter, it is often referred to as
the Puebla Earthquake. The estimated magnitude of the earthquake was 7.1
and affected the capital, Mexico City, and several states. The total number
of casualties was 370 people and over 6,000 people were injured during the
disaster [34]. The earthquake caused over 40 buildings to collapse in Mexico
City [34]. During the aftermath, the Mexican Army and Navy deployed 3,000
troops to Mexico City to perform search and rescue missions along with assist-
ing in the cleaning up efforts. Countries across the world also sent their rescue
teams, consisting of workers and rescue dogs to join in the rescue efforts [64].
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2.2 #Verificado19S
Hours after the earthquake struck, a citizen-led initiative composed of me-
dia outlets, companies, NGOs, and universities got together to organize and
corroborate information to help strengthen the humanitarian response and
provide verified information about the earthquake to anyone interested. The
initiative was dubbed: Verificado19S 1 (Verified19S). Their work led to the cre-
ation of the hashtag #Verificado19S and the Twitter account @Verificado19S,
a reference to verified information related to the earthquake. The hashtag im-
mediately took off across social media. Verificado19S continued to be used
by thousands of people in the earthquake’s aftermath. It became the most
up-to-date source of information about post-earthquake conditions in Mexico,
with 36,000 followers on Twitter [31], and over 500 volunteers on the ground
[13]. The news media started to report how these civic response groups were
organizing [62]. Several news reports covered how these individuals were or-
ganizing on Facebook, Twitter, Whatsapp, and Slack [52,31]. We built off of
these initial news reports to better understand how people used a variety of
social platforms during a natural disaster.
3 Related Work
3.1 Multi-platform Citizen-Led Crisis Response
Social media platforms are increasingly being used during disaster events.
These platforms are frequently used by affected people, emergency responders,
and volunteers to share and seek information, and provide numerous forms of
support [82,80,51,15,8,2]. However, how these social media platforms are used
jointly during a disaster is still understudied [25], especially in the Global South
where Internet access and social media usage differs from developing countries
[49]. Researchers have drawn attention to the importance of understanding and
conceptualizing online social media, as an ecosystem of related elements [20].
They highlight that studying and viewing these interactions at a variety of
resolutions, can enhance our understanding of how people process information
and make use of platforms, and, thus, shed light on why particular platforms
are used and for what reasons [18]. Approaching social media as a holistic
ecosystem will provide us with more realistic analyses [68].
Researchers have started to analyze how individuals perform information
work across platforms during crisis events and how different actors interact on
these platforms. However, most prior work has lacked focus on studying social
media usage in the Global South [59]. Gui et al. analyzed people’s conversa-
tions about making travel decisions in response to the Zika virus crisis on three
online forums: Reddit, BabyCenter, and TripAdvisor, performing a qualitative
study of personal risk assessment on travel-related decision making during the
crisis. In their work, researchers stress that their studies might have missed
1https://verificado19s.org/sobre-v19s/
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information from Latin America, where English is not the primary language
[27]. In a recent example from the US that attempts a broader analysis of this
kind, Dailey and Starbird [20] combined on-site interviews and trace ethnog-
raphy to follow information work across multiple platforms to analyze how
they were used after the 2014 Oso Landslide in Washington state. In Europe,
researchers examined the use of social media during the European Floods of
2013, finding that Twitter was used for status updates, while Facebook gave a
situational overview to coordinate virtual and off-line activities [60]. Another
study in Ecuador investigated how specific individuals used different social
computing platforms for crisis response in an earthquake [80], however; their
study was mainly qualitative with a small number of participants. A recent
research work of the earthquake in Mexico studied in this paper only did a
temporal analysis of the media coverage using Twitter data [19]. These works
provided rich insights about how and why people used different social com-
puting to support informal, on-the-ground, crisis response; however, they are
still limited in scope.
3.2 Information Sharing During Natural Disasters
Timely and accurate communication is essential during a crisis event [15], as
it can facilitate relief and recovery efforts, and reduce anxiety and fears [21].
A body of research has examined how people seek and share local information
online during crises [54,21]. Speed of information sharing renders social media
particularly susceptible to the spread of misinformation [75], due to the factors
of information scarcity and ambiguity during these type of events [54]. One
reason for the spreading of misinformation during disasters is that it can be
challenging for people to understand what information can be trusted amidst
all this socially-generated data [15]. Other researchers have argued that spread-
ing misinformation is part of the collective sense-making process that occurs
during the crisis [74]. Misinformation during disasters has been a major limi-
tation to the use of social media content in the decision making of emergency
respondents [80]. Past research studies have examined the spread of misinfor-
mation on social media during disasters. Starbird et al [71] studied rumors
in the aftermath of the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings, founding evidence
that the online crowd identified and corrected rumors, but they noted that
corrections often lagged behind the misinformation. In a past study, Chauhan
and Hughes [15] used the 2014 Carlton Complex Wildfire to explore who con-
tributes official information online during a crisis event, finding that local news
media played an important role in distributing official crisis information on-
line. Another study [70] found that news media are also more likely to “author
original tweets and to be retweeted” by others. This means that they play an
important function in “shaping the news.” However, the ability of news media
to keep up with the speed of demand for information in a world dominated by
social media means that the dictate “verify, then publish [40]” suffers greatly.
In this paper, we adopt a multi-level perspective that encompasses different
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lenses across various platforms investigating the distinctive structural content
and temporal aspects of the online interactions of individuals during an earth-
quake in the Global South. Our analysis provides a deeper examination as
to how these platforms are cross-referenced and used. We accomplish this by
paying particular attention to the collaborations between participants in order
to support an information verification process during the earthquake and how
their activities and information flow from one platform to the other.
4 Methods
Acknowledging the scale and multi-sited nature of the networked discourse
that we study, we bootstrap off methods for conducting research on online
interactions and collaborations in crisis events [53], network ethnography [5],
and collaborative work within online communities [79] that have had to work
with similar contexts. In specific, we conduct a multi-level analysis that allows
us to first zoom-in and obtain the details of how participants used different
social media platforms during and after the earthquake, and then use those
findings to inform a larger scale study that provides a broad picture about how
different social media platforms were used for #19S. Similar to prior work [79],
the multi-levels we study are: 1) micro; 2) meso; and 3) macro levels.
4.1 Methods: Micro-Level
Our goal at the micro-level was to zoom in and understand how and why
participants of the survey used multiple platforms for #19S. We performed
online surveys to ask people which platforms they used, as well as the reason
they had for using them. The survey included questions about the following:
1. Demographics and background such as age, gender, and location.
2. Open-ended questions about:
– How they contributed to the relief efforts.
– How they used technology to help relief efforts.
– Their perceptions on the impact of their contributions.
3. Multiple choice questions about the platforms used, e.g., “how much did
you use Twitter to help in #19S?”
Recruitment. After the earthquake, news about the relief efforts started
emerging. The narrative from the news media was that #19S volunteers in-
cluded both ordinary and technical people [56,26]. According to news re-
ports, ordinary people were organizing on social media platforms such as Face-
book and Twitter to coordinate efforts [57]. Meanwhile, a group of technolo-
gists launched a website called comoayudar.mx (which translates to “howto-
help.mx”). In there, they invited people with coding skills to collaborate in
technological relief initiatives they were developing. They invited people to
join a Slack group [52,76], specifically the Slack group of Codeando Me´xico2
2
http://slack.codeandomexico.org/
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(Spanish for “Coding for Mexico”), an NGO focused on developing civic tech-
nology in the country3 [44]. Given this range of platforms, we aimed to recruit
both technical and non-technical individuals. For this reason, we posted invi-
tations to our survey on Twitter, Facebook and Slack five months after the
earthquake.
Twitter. Some of the authors tweeted invitations to the survey. Combined,
the authors have 6,921 followers, many of whom are in Mexico. In the tweets,
we used the hashtags4 that news reports related to the earthquake [62,67],
and @mentioned people who used such hashtags.
Facebook. We posted an invitation to our survey on 48 groups that men-
tioned in their name or description one or more of the #19S related hashtags
or keywords that we have previously specified.
Slack. We posted invitations to our survey on the earthquake-related Slack
channels of the group Codeando Me´xico. These channels all had the prefix
“sismomx” (e.g., “earthquakemx”) followed by the channel’s specific focus.
For instance, “#sismomx-verificado19S” was a channel focused on verifying
#19S information.
A total of 356 individuals responded to the survey. Of those 228 partici-
pants stated that they used technology during the relief efforts. Therefore, we
conducted qualitative coding over their open-ended responses from those who
reported using technology, to identify the different purposes that people had
for using different social media in #19S. We identified 8 categories (see Table
2). We hired three Spanish speaking college-educated crowd workers from Up-
work to categorize open-ended survey responses. Two of them were requested
to do the categorization, while we asked the third one to decide the final cate-
gory for those responses in which the two coders could not agree on. The two
coders agreed on 149 responses out of 185 (Cohen’s kappa was 0.8; substantial
agreement). We then asked the third coder to label the remaining survey re-
sponses upon which the first two coders disagreed. We used a “majority rule”
approach to set the category of those remaining responses.
Our survey revealed different purposes that participants had for using mul-
tiple platforms. We dug deep into the most salient purpose which involved
information verification. We conducted a content analysis on the digital traces
left by participants to analyze their work dynamics around this purpose. Jux-
taposing our survey’s findings with the content analysis, helps us build up into
a more macro-understanding of how participants worked to verify information
using multiple platforms.
4.2 Methods: Meso and Macro-Level
Our goal with the meso and macro-level analyses was to have a zoomed out at
scale overview of people’s patterns for using different platforms. In specific, an
overview of how information was assembled over time and the main groups per
3
https://www.codeandomexico.org/
4
#sismoCDMX, #sismoCDMX19Sep17, #FuerzaMexico, #Verificado19S, #ayudaCDMX
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platform involved in content production and with the highest participation. We
collected publicly available data from Facebook, Twitter, Slack, and GitHub
related to #19S from September 19 to October 19 of 2017.
We chose to analyze Twitter, Facebook, Slack, and Github because these
were the main platforms that the news media reported on and the ones that
the survey participants most used. Github was mentioned by Slack users as the
place where they were uploading the tools developed to aid the relief efforts;
therefore, we decided that it was valuable to add in order to broaden our
understanding of the collective efforts involved.
Table 1 shows an overview of the data we collected for each platform.
Platform Participants Posts Groupings
Facebook 10,262 12,606 posts 48 groups and
pages
Twitter 792,665 2,909,109 tweets 29,041 hashtags
Slack 347 28,782 messages 52 groups
GitHub 216 2,602 commits 26 repositories
Table 1: Data collected per platform.
Similar to [79], for our meso-level analysis, we first plotted temporal graphs
of information volume over time per platform. See Fig. 7. This helps us to
have a more general overview of how information was being generated day
by day during the #19S aftermath. By including temporal information in
analyses of user activities, we can enhance understanding of how users navigate
the information space, process information and make use of platforms [68].
Additionally, we analyzed which groups had the highest amount of participants
and plotted how much content they were generating per platform. Our goal
was to identify per social platform the groups that had the most number of
members and also the most content production. For this purpose, we plotted
for each platform and for each group in the platform the number of members
the group had (X-axis) and the number of posts that the group generated
(Y-axis), see Fig. 8. For Twitter, previous work has used hashtags to detect
groups of people with interests in common [65,12]. Therefore, we consider a
group on Twitter as those tweets with a hashtag in common. For Facebook, we
consider a group to be either a page or a group created. For Slack, we consider
a group to be a Slack channel, and for Github, we consider a group to be a
repository.
For our macro-level analysis, we conducted a network analysis to determine
the participants who were considered “influencers” in each social network as
well as those who could facilitate the “spreading of information”. The measure
that allows us to detect the “influencers” in a network is the betweenness
centrality [10]. The betweenness centrality measures the number of times a
node acts as a bridge along the shortest path between two other nodes. A high
betweenness centrality signals a strategic position within the network [61].
To detect those participants that are able to ”spread information”, we use
closeness centrality, as it estimates how easily a node can reach other nodes
in a network [16,61]. The nodes in the network are the accounts of people
Fighting Disaster Misinformation in Latin America: 9
and organizations that were sharing information during the period studied.
The links show how the information was flowing between the nodes. To detect
clusters in the different social media networks we used the Louvain algorithm
[9], a popular algorithm for community detection. In our case, we aimed at
detecting clusters of users communicating among each other.
Our macro-level analysis helps us to understand broadly what grabbed
people’s attention on each platform (what content and what actors were im-
portant), and zoom out to obtain a broader picture of how the general public
used at scale the different social media platforms. Here, we also study how peo-
ple referenced content on other platforms. Then, we describe how we collected
data from each platform:
Twitter. We used Gnip Power Track, a commercial data provider, to col-
lect 2,909,109 tweets with the hashtags known to be used by people involved
in the #19S, these were the same hashtags we used to advertise our survey.
We operationalized “posts” as tweets, and “groups” as hashtags. The latter
because previous research has shown that Twitter hashtags help cluster people
around particular topics [11], acting as ad hoc groups.
Facebook. We used Facebook’s public graph API to assess the creation of
new groups and pages, and the posts people published on them. We tracked 48
groups and pages. We collected 12,606 posts from them. We asked permission
to collect data from the administrators of the pages and groups. When possible,
we also posted on the Facebook groups and pages to let people know we wanted
to do an anonymized log analysis of their posts for research purposes.
Slack. We collected 28,782 messages that people posted across the 52 chan-
nels related to #19S that existed in Codeando Me´xico’s Slack. We counted the
daily messages exchanged across all earthquake channels as “posts,” and the
creation dates for the channels. We informed Slack administrators that we
wanted to do an anonymized log analysis of their posts for research purposes.
GitHub. Technologists used the platforms Slack and Github to oper-
ate5. We first collected the GitHub links that people mentioned on Twitter,
Facebook, and Slack in earthquake-related messages. Altogether, we identi-
fied 26 GitHub links pointing to different repositories, e.g., coding projects.
We tracked their creation dates. Also, for each of these GitHub repositories
we collected their description, IDs of people contributing to the project, and
when commits occurred, e.g., changes to the source code. In total, we collected
2,602 commits. We contacted the authors of each repository whenever possible
to let them know that we wanted to do an anonymized analysis for research
purposes.
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Category Freq
(Pct)
Description
1) Read, Share and Verify
News
66
(29%)
Any comment related to news reports about the
earthquake. This includes reading and verifying
news.
2) Share Needs 52
(23%)
Share the needs of different parts of the country
that were affected by #19S.
3) Receive Updates from
Friends and Family
25
(11%)
Use technology to confirm that family, friends,
or co-workers are safe after the earthquake.
4) Donate Money 25
(11%)
Any comment related to donating either money,
supplies or provisions to help #19S victims.
5) Build Digital Tools 21 (9%) Create new technological tools to help the rescue
efforts or to assist victims.
6) Conduct Data Analysis 16 (7%) Perform data analysis or data processing.
7) Connect Strangers 14 (6%) Connect people who did not know each other
but who could collaborate and help each other
in the earthquake aftermath. It also includes re-
connecting people who went missing.
8) Mobilize People Offline 9 (4%) Incite people to physically go to locations to help
earthquake victims or ask volunteers who are
already on the ground to help in a particular
way.
Table 2: Description of the different purposes for which participants
used multiple platforms in the #19S aftermath. Information taken
from 228 survey respondents who stated they helped the relief
efforts using technology.
5 Results
5.1 Micro-level: Survey
Our examination focused on how participants jointly used the platforms of
Facebook, Twitter, Slack, and GitHub to contribute to earthquake relief ef-
forts. The majority, 88%(N=313), of survey responders were located in Mexico.
The rest were participants in the Mexican diaspora. The median age of partici-
pants was 25 years old (SD = 9.8 years). When asked about how the earthquake
affected them, 22% (N=78) reported being personally affected, 39%(N=139)
had friends and family affected, 21%(N=75) had some type of connection with
earthquake victims, and 32%(N=114) had no connection to anyone affected
by the earthquake. Note that participants could have multiple connections
5https://github.com/CodeandoMexico/terremoto-cdmx
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to earthquake victims. Most participants in our survey, 64% (N=228), stated
they helped the relief efforts using technology, investing a median of 20 hours:
ranging from less than an hour to almost 3 months. Through our survey, we
also identified that two additional platforms were used by participants during
the earthquake: WhatsApp and Snapchat. While the information on Snapchat
was not included in our investigation due to its potentially temporary nature
and difficulty in validating the activity, we have investigated how specifically
Whatsapp was utilized by participants in order to understand the informa-
tion flow and use in coordination efforts during the aftermath of the #19S
earthquake [66]. Table 2 presents a description of the different ways partici-
pants contributed to relief efforts using multiple technologies in response to
our survey questions. Note that we only use the responses of participants who
stated using technology (228 individuals). Therefore, our following analysis
represents only the responses of those participants
Read, Share and Verify News.
The primary way in which participants felt they contributed to the relief
efforts using multiple platforms, with 29%(N=66) reporting this behavior, was
by reading, sharing, and verifying news reports about #19S. Participants con-
sidered it valuable to share news reports across social computing platforms
because it enabled their different social circles to understand the important
events occurring in the #19S aftermath. Sharing particular news reports also
seemed to help participants frame the events of the aftermath without creating
a sense of panic:
“I tried to read through news reports and share useful information. If I
did not do this, I knew that confusion and panic would emerge from
all the information floating around. I tried to share news reports that
could be useful...:P1”
Sharing news also usually included the activity of verifying the news before
sharing it across multiple social computing platforms:
“I only shared the news that I had personally verified. I didn’t share
chain news messages that I had no idea where they came from. So I
shared very little [...] It was important to share verified news because
when there’s a lot of fake information circulating you only agitate...:P2”
Some individuals had strict norms about the type of news they shared.
They adopted these norms to ensure that people knew what was really taking
place across the country and could thus better identify where to help out:
“We had a rule, if the news was true, then you needed to share pho-
tographs on Facebook and Twitter. This way we ensured that all the help
we deployed was accurate...:P3”
Prior work had identified that people usually trusted citizen reporters who
were physically in the disaster zone [35]. It is noteworthy that people in Mexico
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were skeptical of citizen reporters and actively had them verify their sources
(e.g., by requesting photographs). We also saw participants start educating
their peers about misinformation. Participants seemed to organize with friends
on WhatsApp to curate together learning material. They then shared it on
Twitter or Facebook to teach others about misinformation:
“I verified news reports to foster a culture of education on the Inter-
net. I wanted users to learn that they shouldn’t fill common places, like
Facebook, with misinformation [...] The key to our success was using
WhatsApp and Google Docs. We discussed what educational message
we wanted to communicate on WhatsApp. We then used the Google doc
to actually create the content, all the details of what we would post on
Facebook and Twitter.:P4”
Sharing news during natural disasters can lead to the emergence of mis-
information [84]. The correct handling of misinformation is important as its
spread can increase the sense of chaos in the aftermath of a crisis event [3].
Previous research had documented how in the past people have usually taken
“reactive strategies” to deal with misinformation [71,4]. For instance, it was
only after rumors spread that people reacted and tried to correct the post-
ings. But for #19S we saw people with more evolved and proactive attitudes,
specifically verifying information to avoid creating rumors in the first place.
Share Needs. The second most common way in which participants con-
tributed to the relief efforts was by sharing the needs that existed throughout
Mexico in the aftermath of the earthquake, 23%(N=52). Participants seemed
to use multiple platforms because it facilitated accessing diverse social groups
who could provide different perspectives about the current needs, such as
location-specific needs or needs that only certain professions would under-
stand, e.g., medical needs:
“Facebook became a window of the needs of the city in specific points.
It was very easy for any cyclist to be on a spot and upload something.
It also helped us to reach different professionals, like musicians...:P5”
Needs tended to be shared with the following dynamic: 1) on-the-ground
volunteers took notes about what was needed in different regions; 2) these
individuals then shared this information via private messages, e.g., on What-
sApp, to online friends who then created Twitter or Facebook posts to inform
the general population. Here, participants also struggled on the best ways to
present needs without creating a sense of panic in others, but while inciting
people to address those needs:
“Virtually I communicated with my friends on WhatsApp to recompile
and organize information about what donations were needed in differ-
ent parts of the city. We organized a strategy on WhatsApp to inform
Facebook volunteers about where they could bring their donations [...]
We discussed what to post and how to post it to avoid creating panic.
Others shared everything raw and that tended to incite fear.:P6”
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Receive Updates from Friends and Family. One of the third most
common ways (11%(N=25)) participants used social media platforms to par-
ticipate in #19S relief efforts was by requesting friends and family members
to provide status updates on their safety after the earthquake. The platforms
participants selected to receive updates seemed to depend on the type of rela-
tionships they had:
“I used my cellphone and landline to call and find the people I knew.
A text message to the individuals I knew less. Email with people from
my school who didn’t answer the phone or did not have a Facebook
profile.:P7”
There was a tendency to use multiple platforms to consecutively do the
actions of receiving updates from friends and making donations. Participants
usually first communicated with contacts who were physically in the areas
affected by the earthquake and then donated money to help relief efforts:
“I got in contact with a friend on Whatsapp to know how he was [...]
He was on the ground helping. I made a donation to him on PayPal
and he bought food for earthquake victims...:P8”
Build Technology. Participants also used social media platforms during
the earthquake to build technology (9% (N=21)) and to conduct data analy-
sis (7% (N=16)). Note that all of these individuals considered themselves to
be technologists, e.g., they had technological skills and worked in tech-related
fields. Such individuals reported they primarily used Slack and GitHub to or-
ganize. These technologists reported that they deployed most of the tools they
created on existing social computing platforms, such as Facebook or Twitter
because they felt more individuals would likely use their tools if they co-existed
in spaces people already used:
“I participated in the Twitter bot project of #FakeSismo that shared
#19S news [...] we moved to Twitter because users who were not experts
like us use it frequently...:P9”
It was also interesting to observe that while technologists noted that their
tools might not have been used by many #19S victims, this did not seem to
bother them. Their main goals seemed to have been more on investing in a
culture of prevention:
“More than just creating tools to analyze what happened, it’s about cre-
ating prevention [...] generating conscience and a culture of preven-
tion...:P10”
The culture of prevention in the event of a crisis could be considered dual-
purpose: building technology to coordinate rescue efforts and implementing
tools to assist with the flow of information. Instituting a process and a men-
tality of assisting rescue efforts in situations of crisis might be the obvious
result in creating a culture of prevention; however, we can also understand
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their efforts to promote tools that permitted the flow of information as a nec-
essary prevention against misinformation solidifying in people’s minds during
crises [42]. Their efforts thus set a precedent for facilitating the ability to refute
misinformation during future crises.
Connect Strangers. Similar to previous findings [59], participants also
used technology for connecting two or more strangers so that they could help
each other in the aftermath of #19S (6%(N=14)). Participants tended to read
in Facebook or Twitter the needs that existed in Mexico, and then actively
searched across social computing platforms to find people who could address
those needs:
“I read people’s needs on Twitter and then I would connect them with
people who I thought could help them (doctors I knew, vets, psycholo-
gists, translators.):P11”
Mobilize People Offline. Participants also used multiple platforms to
incite people to physically go to certain locations and help earthquake relief
efforts (4%(N=9). Mobilize people offline included organizing volunteers who
were already currently on the ground to help in a particular way. We observed
that the activities of “Sharing Needs” “Reading, Sharing and Verifying News”
and “Mobilize people offline” appeared to be closely related. Individuals tended
to use Twitter to sort through the needs and news reports to understand what
was taking place and where help might be the most needed. They would then go
on Facebook, Messenger or WhatsApp to convince and mobilize their contacts
to take offline action and help:
“Twitter helped me to identify what was going on in each collection
center. I would then go on Facebook and message my students. My hope
was that I could motivate them to go to a particular collection center
to help...:P12”
The individuals who engaged in this activity appeared to be those who
considered they did not have the physical condition to help in offline relief
efforts. But they found this online activity as a way to positively contribute.
This resembles how people with disabilities contribute to offline activism [43].
“My wife was the one who advised me, that although I may be old I could
help coordinate those volunteers on the ground by telling them how to
follow security measures, how to evacuate a building safely, where to
get support, and also where their help was most needed...:P13”
It is worth noting that the percentage of this category is below “Conduct
data analysis” or “Build digital tools”. This could be due to characteristics of
individuals who answered our survey. It is highly likely that participants who
spend more time on Slack were more willing to answer our survey than those
who were working offline on relief efforts.
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5.2 Micro-level: Content Analysis
Our survey revealed that one of the main reasons why participants used mul-
tiple social media platforms in the #19S aftermath was to read, share and
verify news. We, therefore, aimed to understand this process more deeply. For
this purpose, we adopted an approach similar to [79] and examined the digital
traces (conversations, hashtags, tweets, linked content and websites referenced)
left by participants on the different platforms they reported. Analyzing these
observations, helps us build up into a more macro understanding of how people
worked to support an information verification process during the earthquake.
Crowdsourcing Information Validation. We realized from people’s
Twitter posts, that in order to collect and verify information, they were using
a crowdsourcing mechanism where they gave people micro-tasks to help in the
verification process, see Fig. 2.
1
2
1
2
“Verificado is a collective effort to work better. All the info:
“Google Forms Links”
Fig. 1: Tweet with a link to a
Google Form requesting people
to state how they wanted to
help out in the relief efforts.
They first shared a tweet that included
a link to a Google Form. They requested
people to fill out the form and state how
they wanted to help out in the relief efforts.
Some of the options people could select in-
cluded: digital volunteering opportunities
such as input verified information to online
maps, verify damages and needs for collec-
tion centers and shelters; report damaged
buildings/streets and verify citizen news
reports; and transport and delivery of ma-
terials or people in need, among other op-
tions. Fig. 1 presents an example of such
type of tweets. Depending on what peo-
ple had selected, they were then tweeted
specific micro-tasks to start helping (e.g.,
“help verify that a shelter needed water”).
These mechanisms highlight how peo-
ple utilized user-generated content not only to find out necessities on affected
areas but to fact-check word of mouth reports about the situation in the city.
People in these cases seemed to have worked closely with @Verificado19S as
they mentioned the account frequently in their tweets and retweeted their
content. Verificado19S appears to have functioned as a civic response group
that brought trust and through this trust could crowdsource and organize on-
demand volunteers on the ground to verify information [22]. Previous studies
have found that if information providers clearly identify themselves and share
their goals of giving reliable information, it grants them credibility and facil-
itates the co-participation of citizens [15]. This dynamic appears to be what
we are identifying with Verificado19S in the #19S.
Dealing with Outdated Information. Through our manual Twitter
analysis, we identified that Verificado19S started standardizing all its calls to
action (e.g., posts that asked citizens to volunteer in a specific way.)
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Send Microtasks1 2 3 Verify info. on the 
ground
Send back info.4
5 Share verified info.
Spread verified info 
across different social 
media platforms
6
Recruit Volunteers 
on Social Media
Fig. 2: Crowdsourcing Information Validation
Fig. 3: a) Tweet with a call to action from the @Verificado19S ’s
Twitter account. b) Facebook post with an image taken from
@Verificado19S ’s Twitter feed.
Verificado19S used a template that involved an image with the date, time,
place, specific needs and contact person, as well as the place where things were
needed, see Fig. 3 a). Verificado19S constantly tweeted multiple times per
day about resources that were needed in different disaster zones and shelters.
We believe that by integrating a date and time to the images, it directly
helped citizens to identify what information in a given time frame was relevant.
Therefore, if the same image was shared within other social platforms later
(see e.g., Fig.3 b), people could better decide on whether they wanted to take
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Fig. 4: Template created by the
Slack crowd to be used by
@Verificado19S
Fig. 5: Facebook post reshared by a
user adding date and time.
action or not (e.g., it might have been something that was needed days ago,
so it might not be urgent anymore.)
Our Slack analysis revealed that citizens operating within Slack had been
the ones to brainstorm ideas that ultimately led to developing the image tem-
plate that was later adopted by Verificado19S in order to share needs at scale.
Fig 4. shows an example of the template that participants were collectively
designing on Slack. We also analyzed the Facebook posts that our survey par-
ticipants shared within public Facebook groups. We found that people started
adopting some of the same conventions that Verificado19S had been push-
ing. Fig. 5, shows how a participant of a Facebook group reshared a post,
adding the approximate date and time it was posted. This is noteworthy as
past research has suggested that information that is outdated can affect the
coordination and efficiency of relief efforts [80]. It is interesting to observe how
people in the #19S earthquake were able to develop their own mechanisms to
overcome this problem across social media platforms.
Educating People about Misinformation. By manually analyzing the
online interactions of our survey participants on Slack, we found that partici-
pants were organizing to develop tools to deal with misinformation during the
crisis. Some of the tools included: 1) BanFakeNews, a web platform to report
fake news being spread during the crisis, 2) Fake News Bot, a Twitter bot to
distribute and classify information on social media about possible fake news.
Our digital trace analysis led us to find the first messages in which participants
discussed organizing to tackle the problem:
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1
2
3
4
1
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3
4
“URGENT: Valid at all times. What is 
verifying?” If these two simple steps are 
not met, then it is #FakeNews. Contribute: 
Do not spread fake news.
“We request your help:”
Attention: This information is being 
updated in real time. Check again before 
going out on the streets to help.
Attention: 
When something is verified it means two 
things:
1) That you SAW IT with YOUR OWN 
eyes.
2) That at least TWO different persons 
told you that they SAW IT with THEIR 
own eyes
Any other information 
IS NOT VERIFIED
Fig. 6: Image created to educate users about misinformation:
Attention: Something Verified means only two things: 1) That you
saw it with your own eyes. 2) That at least two different people
saw it with their own eyes. Anything else is not verified.
This is a big problem [misinformation] because on social media there
are a lot of people sharing tons of it.: S user1
Someone suggested creating an exclusive Slack channel to focus on dealing
with the problem:
Create a channel to focus on the problem, as it is a big one. Make
a request to (S Volunteer1) to create it. It could be called. sismomx-
fakenews [earthquakemx-fakenews].: S user3
On the newly created channel called “sismomx-fakenews”, participants started
to brainstorm ideas about how to solve the problem of misinformation. After
some discussion, they decided to develop an educational flyer that could ed-
ucate people about misinformation and how to easily verify anything they
wanted to share online. This flyer was also shared by Verificado19S to educate
people at scale about misinformation, see Fig.6. This image was distributed by
the Twitter account of Verificado19S and obtained 1,711 retweets and 1,266
likes.
5.3 Results: Meso-Level
Our meso-level analysis studies how information was assembled on different
social media platforms. This level allows us to view how information was being
generated. For this purpose, for each platform, we study: 1) the number of daily
posts; 2) groups that had the most number of members and the most content
production; 3) references to other platforms.
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9/19 9/29 10/9 10/19 9/19 9/29 10/9 10/19
Tweets Slack Messages
Facebook Posts Github Commits
9/19 9/29 10/9 10/19 9/19 9/29 10/9 10/19
Github Commits
Fig. 7: “Posts” across platforms through time.
5.3.1 Daily number of posts.
Fig. 7 presents the daily number of posts generated per platform over time. We
notice that for all platforms, the number of posts decreased overtime. Twitter
was the platform where people produced the largest content volume that we
could observe from our data. The highest peak occurred on September 20 of
2017, the day right after the earthquake, with 865,508 tweets. There is an
interesting outbreak on October 7 that occurred because the national football
team paid tribute to Frida, the dog who became famous for her assistance in
the earthquake relief efforts [45] and a symbol of hope in the country [23].
The tribute was covered by international media [23] and people were tweeting
about it.
The second platform where people produced the most content was Slack.
However, the highest peak on Slack occurred on September 21 of 2017. We
hypothesize that this might have occurred because technical people took the
time to organize and recruit others to build tools for the earthquake response
efforts. Additionally, we observe that across all platforms the activity quickly
died out as the days advanced. It is interesting to note, however, that on Slack
on October 1st, there was a brief reactivation; people suddenly started posting
again more. Upon inspection, we observed that on that date there had been
an aftershock from #19S. This event might have driven people’s reactivation.
The reactivation only happened on Slack (where primarily the technologists
operated.). On Facebook, there was a reactivation on October 11th. After
further inspection of the posts, we did not find evidence of anything unusual
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Fig. 8: Content per “group” on each platform.
shared on the platform during that day. The posts were primarily from people
within the Facebook groups that aimed to reunite lost pets with their owners.
In general, all the graphs decreased in activity as the days passed. Research
that analyzed media coverage on Twitter from the same event [19], found that
the tweets related to the earthquake had an initial peak and then an exponen-
tial decay as the days passed. We found that this was not only occurring on
Twitter but it also happened on the other social networks as well.
Groups with the highest amount of participants and content. In
our meso-level analysis, we identified which group had the highest amount
of participants and content, see Fig.8. This helps us to understand which
“groups” got the most amount of attention.
Twitter. The hashtag with the most number of tweets was #FuerzaMexico
(point T1), (it means Mexico Strong), see Fig. 8. This hashtag helped bring
attention to the aftermath of the earthquake. The hashtag was used to share
ways to help [32]. The hashtag had 814,340 tweets with 404,218 participants.
The second hashtag with the most amount of tweets was #Verificado19S. It
had 107,280 tweets with 77,209 participants.
Previous work [17] found that a hashtag has the ability to draw large au-
diences, but its widespread usage during a crisis event can create inefficiencies
in communicating relevant information. As the information is generated by
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thousands of participants at a high speed, this could create a significant hur-
dle to find relevant content. We found that in some cases this was happening,
as requests for help were tweeted using more than one hashtag.
Facebook. The group with the most number of participants and posts
had the purpose of connecting lost pets with their owners (point F1 in Fig.
8). The group had 369 participants that generated 2,880 posts in total. The
second group with the most number of posts (point F2) had 1,606 posts in
total and 309 participants. It was related to “sharing needs” and “connecting
strangers”. The fact that the group with the most posts was related to re-
uniting pets with their owners, and the second one belonged to categories in
which people were requesting help and connecting strangers, tells us about the
importance of having reliable information. We believe that mechanisms such
as the one developed by Verificado19S were important to make relief efforts
more efficient.
Slack. For Slack, We discovered that the most active channels were those
related to “building digital tools” and “building websites.”. The channel with
the most messages was “sismomx-fakenews” (point S1 in Fig. 8). As mentioned
previously, this channel focused on creating a website to report fake news. It
had 4,926 messages and 61 participants. The second channel with the most
messages was “sismomx-acopio-api”, with 4,314 messages and 80 participants
(point S2). This channel focused on creating APIs to query data about avail-
able shelters. This empowered others to do data analysis or build tools (e.g.,
people built a website6 that used the API to provide real-time information
about the shelters).
Github. Similar to Slack we decided to analyze the repositories with
the greater number of participants and commits (changes to the project) on
Github. With this, we wanted to uncover what repositories where considered
more relevant. Studying these variables helps us to identify the projects where
people were focusing their attention on as they were contributing code and
making updates. Fig. 8 point G1, shows that the repository with most com-
mits (666) was for building a website where people could easily access all the
information about shelters, collection centers, hospitals, etc. It had 20 partic-
ipants in total. The second repository with most commits (542) was a tool to
provide real-time information about the shelters (point G2).
5.3.2 Cross-references between platforms.
We analyzed how people cross-referenced platforms to get a perspective of how
the users of a particular platform might amplify information from other on-
line spaces. Table 3 shows a comparison of the mentions of different platforms
within a specific online space. We see that people on Facebook did reference
Twitter, but there was no mention of Slack or GitHub. Similarly, people on
Twitter did reference Facebook but made little or no mentions of GitHub or
Slack. People on Slack, on the other hand, did reference all the other platforms
6
https://www.sismosmexico.org/
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with Twitter and GitHub being more prominent. This makes sense when we
recall that in our micro-level analysis technologists organized their tool build-
ing within Slack and Github, and they built tools that coexisted on Facebook
or Twitter. Slack appeared to have acted in some cases as a backstage into
what was shared and posted on other social media sites, such as Twitter.
Facebook Twitter Slack GitHub
Facebook - 19 0 0
Twitter 2115 - 0 1
Slack 70 287 - 766
GitHub 7 25 17 -
Table 3: Number of cross-references that people within a particular
platform made about other social computing platforms.
5.4 Results: Macro-Level
To obtain a broad overview of who was involved in the information space within
each social media platform, we analyzed the structure of the conversations
on each platform through network graphs. For this purpose, we conducted a
network analysis similar to what prior research in crisis informatics has used
to conduct a macro-level type analysis [79]. To further understand how these
different actors interacted with each other, we adopted an approach similar to
[5] and inspect the interactions of the accounts using interpretative analysis of
a network graph based on graph flows.
For the network analysis, we created network connections between two
users depending on various ways in which they interacted: on Twitter, it was
based on whether they reshared each others’ tweets; on Facebook, it was based
on whether a user posted a message on other users post; on Slack, it was based
on whether they replied (mentioned) each other in a message; on GitHub, it
was based on whether they contributed to the same projects together or forked
each others’ projects, e.g., they made commits to the same GitHub repositories
or made copies of each other’s project. We used the Louvain algorithm to
detect clusters of users communicating among each other, and the ForceAtlas2
algorithm to obtain the overall structure of the network graph [36].
In Fig. 9, each node represents a particular account, sized by the number
of interactions with the other accounts. For example, for the Twitter graph,
large nodes represent a highly reshared accounts. Nodes are connected via a
directional edge from a resharing account to a reshared account. Each edge is
weighted by the number of reshares between the two.
For each graph, we used the Louvain algorithm to uncover and color-code
the different networks (clusters) present in each social computing platform. For
each platform, we analyzed the main clusters of each network and described
the most relevant actors within the information space. For each graph, we
calculate the betweenness centrality and the closeness centrality of the nodes.
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Fig. 9: Network Graphs per Social Computing Platform.
The betweenness centrality allows us to detect the “influencers” of a network
as nodes with high betweenness facilitate the information flow. The closeness
centrality allows us to detect the “spread of information” through the network,
as it allows us to measure how easily a node can reach other nodes in the
network.
Twitter Network Graph. Fig. 9 presents the network graph we com-
puted for Twitter. Here, we iteratively visualized the network graph (and hence
the information flow) by defining nodes to be Twitter accounts and directed
edges to be retweets between the accounts.
We see that the “influencers” in the network are @PresidenciaMX and
@Verificado19S with betweenness centrality value of 1,468,135 and 1,051,938
respectively. By looking at their closeness centrality, we can see that they are
both similar, @PresidenciaMX has a value of 0.3367 and @Verificado19S has
a value of 0.3124. However, even though both are influencers in the network
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with a high capacity of spreading information, there was no communication
between the accounts. The most retweeted account was not an account from
an official long-standing institution in Mexico, but from @Verificado19S [76].
This account was created on September 23rd, 2017 (four days after #19S).
@Verificado19S was retweeted a total of 17,638 times during the period col-
lected. Overall, @Verificado19S seemed to have operated within the category
of “Reading, Sharing, and Verifying News” that we discovered in our micro-
level analysis.
The second most retweeted account belonged to Mexico’s presidency
( @PresidenciaMX). Its tweets were retweeted a total of 15,168 times (2,470
times less than @Verificado19S ). Upon manual inspection, we identified that
the tweets from Mexico’s presidency seemed to have focused on providing tips
to recognize misinformation, and request that people complete a survey of their
current status (i.e., were people OK?). Overall, @PresidenciaMX seemed to
have operated within the “Reading, Sharing, and Verifying News” and “Re-
ceiving Updates” categories.
From the node structure of Fig. 9, we observed that the accounts of @Ver-
ificado19S and @article19mex, an NGO fighting for people’s free speech and
information rights, had overlap in the nodes around them. This means that
these accounts tended to retweet and amplify each others’ content. This result
makes sense as @article19mex belongs to the conglomerate of organizations
that cooperated with the @Verificado19S effort [77]. We notice similar pat-
terns in the Mexican government accounts: @PresidenciaMX, @Prospera Mx.
It is interesting that the accounts focused on information verification (@Ver-
ificado19S and @article19mex ) seemed to have operated independently from
the Mexican government; and that the news media (@Milenio, NTelevisa com,
@SoyReferee) appeared to have acted as an intermediary between these two
types of organizations (amplifying both their messages). We believe that this
was due to the lack of trust in the government that has been an issue in the
overall region [7].
Facebook Network Graph. Fig. 9 presents the network graph we com-
puted for Facebook. We iteratively visualized conversation flows between ac-
counts by constructing the network graph in which we defined nodes to be
Facebook accounts and directed edges to be messages. In this graph, we see
that one of the main differences between the network graphs of Facebook and
Twitter is that on Facebook the accounts with the most influence were not
accounts from celebrities, but rather Facebook Groups created by ordinary
people; this is, people who were Facebook group administrators. The account
with the highest betweenness centrality had a value of 181,488 and a close-
ness centrality of 0.2908. These accounts also appeared to operate more within
the category of “Connecting Strangers” that we identified in our micro-level
analysis.
The accounts whose posts were commented the most came primarily from
Facebook groups related to lost and found pets. Additionally, these groups
tried to connect people who had found a lost pet with the pet’s owner. The
slight separation that exists between clusters in Fig. 9 is because people ap-
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peared to have operated more within particular Facebook groups that managed
very local information, e.g., F Volunteer7 shared only photos of lost dogs from
a specific neighborhood in Mexico City (note that we anonymized names of
ordinary people’s accounts).
Slack Network Graph. Slack does not have a reshare button. To draw
the network graph we utilized information about how much each account was
mentioned by others. We visualized mention flows between accounts by defin-
ing nodes to be Slack accounts and directed edges between the nodes to be
mentions between accounts. The Slack network graph in Fig. 9 reveals a large
central cluster, in purple, of the account with the highest betweenness central-
ity: S Volunteer1. Upon manual inspection, we identified that S Volunteer1
was the director of Codeando Me´xico who tried to organize everyone to build
digital tools and was organizing most of the work on the different Slack chan-
nels (hence why he was mentioned the most). The betweenness centrality of the
account (influence power) was 37,255 and his closeness centrality was 0.6306.
The account was mentioned a total of 937 times by 177 users. The other most
mentioned accounts were accounts leading the production of different tools (in
the description of the Slack channel where they operated they were usually
also mentioned as the leaders).
Github Network Graph. GitHub does not have a direct reshare but-
ton. Thus, we analyzed those users whose GitHub repositories had the largest
number of contributors and the most number of individuals who forked their
project. We created a network between two people if one person had directly
participated in the GitHub repository of the other or they had forked their
project. From Fig. 9 we see that only two volunteers with their repositories
were the ones with higher betweenness centrality: the volunteer who created
the repository of “comoayudarmx”, with a betweenness centrality of 3,376 and
a closeness centrality of 0.3608., and the volunteer who created the repository
of “terremoto-cdmx”, with a betweenness centrality of 3,463 and a closeness
centrality of 0.3559. The repository of comoayudarmx had 86 contributors
with an average of 8 commits per contributor and a total of 666 commits.
Similarly, terremoto-cdmx had 82 contributors, with an average of 7 commits
per contributor and a total of 542 commits. Other repositories had only one
contributor. The main characteristic that appeared to exist between these two
Github volunteers is that their repositories were also the most mentioned on
Slack.
6 Discussion
In this section, we explain different ways in which people adapted their use
of social media to overcome its limitations. We compare our findings with the
previous theoretical understanding of behavior during crisis events and use
them to make recommendations for technology design in order to improve the
effectiveness of social media use during crisis response efforts.
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6.1 Misinformation Mitigation During Crisis Events
Past research [28,29], has identified that during crisis events due to heightened
anxiety and emotional vulnerabilities, people are often more susceptible to be-
lieve and share misinformation. In another study, Starbird et. al [71] found
that during disasters individuals usually are more “reactive” with misinforma-
tion. They wait until it is a problem to react, correct, and stop it. However,
corrections tended to spread more slowly than misinformation. Prior work has
also shown that social computing platforms facilitate constructing an infras-
tructure for crisis response [20]. This is, users are not confined to use just one
social media platform during a crisis event; they use a plethora of them to be
informed about the unfolding events that occur in the aftermath of a disaster.
However, they still find barriers to using social media during a crisis situation
because of a lack of trust in the information they see [41]. Due to the fast
paced nature of information circulating during a disaster event, preventing
the spread of misinformation in the first place is important.
Our research uncovered different mechanisms that can help mitigate the
spread of misinformation during a crisis event. The first one was an organized
citizen-driven approach. We found that Verificado19S acted as an independent
and trustworthy organization that used on-the-ground citizens to verify infor-
mation. In this way, Verificado19S was able to engage and organize citizens in
the process of information verification, e.g., organizing people who were within
certain streets to help verify specific disaster information.
6.2 Keeping Information Relevant
The second approach was dealing with outdated information. Previous work
stressed social media’s ability to help citizens self-regulate inaccurate and out-
dated information [69], but it has been found that self-regulation does not
happen at the pace needed for supporting logistic efforts during a crisis [80].
Past work [33,73] has identified that ensuring that the information that is
shared online is “relevant” and “trustworthy” are some of the major difficulties
that people encounter when using social media during disasters. Information
that is outdated (and hence no longer relevant) can complicate response efforts,
jeopardizing the safety of first responders and the community [80].
To overcome this, Verificado19S developed a mechanism to keep impor-
tant information useful and understandable over time, even if it was spread
on different social media platforms. Our analysis uncovered how Verificado19S
developed its own organic mechanisms to start to bring a sense of ephemer-
ality to their posts and overcome the fact that most social media platforms
operate with data permanence. In specific, Verificado19S used simple mecha-
nisms, such as encoding timestamps into images to give people a sense of what
information was outdated and which one was relevant. This lead to a form of
forgetful digital memory, which ensured that the important information was
kept useful and understandable over time [48].
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This capability can be replicated by social media platforms during times
of crises to give more visibility to time-sensitive information as the crisis is
unfolding, and keep information that is shared on different social media plat-
forms relevant. For instance, if someone wanted to reshare a need that was
requested a long time ago, the platform could create mechanisms to remind
the person when that publication was posted in the first place, and prompt
the end-user to reconsider sharing as outdated information could complicate
response efforts [80].
Although data permanence is a standard feature of many social media sites
[63], researchers have argued about the virtues of “forgetting” as a design
feature in social media applications [81]. Providing ephemerality might be
especially useful during disasters to eliminate information that is outdated
and hence irrelevant. It is important that social media platforms realize that in
times of crisis cross-platform collaborations will happen; therefore, we believe
that they should ensure to create cross-platform mechanisms to allow the
flow of information and diminish the spread of outdated information that can
potentially make response efforts more difficult.
6.3 Educating People About Misinformation
The third approach was educating people about misinformation. Our investi-
gation revealed how Verificado19S and technologists organized to create edu-
cational material to educate people about how to self-verify information, as it
informed the users of the best practices that they should follow before shar-
ing something on social media. Our survey also showed that participants were
conscious about the importance of personally making sure that the informa-
tion that they were about to share was accurate, and they took care to make
photographic evidence before sharing the information on multiple social com-
puting platforms. This highlights how people in #19S were conscious about
the importance of making sure the information was correct before spreading
it on social media, and hence prevent misinformation.
For future crises, social media platforms might consider revisiting this type
of educational material and possibly use it to educate new populations affected
by natural disasters. We believe it is also important to identify the differences
this educational material has with traditional educational content. This might
help identify an important gap in teaching people digital skills around misin-
formation.
6.4 Trustworthy Organizations To Bridge Government and Society
An important difference that we found with previous work was the use of
a citizen-led initiative for coordinating relief efforts. Although Verificado19S
was very new, we believe it gained credibility and recognition because it
worked with a collective of independent citizens from industry, nonprofits,
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and academia. It likely also helped that, as our macro-level analysis show-
cased, Verificado19S operated independently from the government, which is
generally distrusted in the Global South [7]. We found similarities with a study
in Ecuador [80] in which Wong et al. observed an unwillingness of citizens to
communicate or collaborate with the government to bring aid to affected ar-
eas. In our investigation, the patterns of communications across social media
showed that they preferred to collaborate with Verificado19S, in a citizen-
driven approach for crisis response. The popularity of Verificado19S, reflected
by the news coverage it had [76,13,22,31,52], and in our macro-analysis by the
number of retweets, might have been precisely because it was an autonomous
new organization that emerged organically in the #19S aftermath. This high-
lights that during crisis relief work, we cannot always assume that citizens will
be willing to share information with the government, as it has been found in
other research work [55,38].
However, we believe that due to the social framework behind Verificado19S,
it is worth adopting a similar approach in other countries in which trustwor-
thiness in governmental institutions is low, such as Latin America [7].
7 Design Implications
Our macro-level analysis uncovered that ordinary citizens creating niche Face-
book pages and groups that revolved around connecting people (e.g., to find
missing individuals or their lost pets) were the ones with the most influence.
Meanwhile, on Twitter, the most influential accounts belonged to organiza-
tions. These results highlight how the different affordances of social computing
platforms might have facilitated certain types of self-organization for disaster
response. Facebook’s news feed algorithm promotes more personal content
shared by ordinary people rather than news from organizations; while Twit-
ter’s algorithmic feed has put a greater focus on news and what others have
liked or retweeted [37]. We believe it is important for practitioners and re-
searchers to question: what interactions might be hindered by the algorithmic
powers in play? and how might they affect the way people organize not only
for disasters but for how our societies are constructed? Some social media plat-
forms have already started to implement new affordances for times of crisis.
For instance, Facebook allows citizens to mark they are safe during a crisis.
However, we believe that platforms still have a lot of work to do to identify the
type of affordances and social interactions that they want to facilitate during
a crisis, especially the type of collaborations they want to facilitate to citizens
across platforms.
Regarding the spread of misinformation, we believe social media platforms
should tackle the problem from a cross-platform perspective. Meaning that
they should realize that in times of crisis, information will eventually flow
from one platform to another. Therefore, it might be helpful during a crisis
to incorporate “watermarks” onto the images and information that is shared
online to help people contextualize when and where that data was generated.
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Our results showcased that people actively created their own “watermarks”
to help others better identify when certain information came from another
platform and might be now “outdated”. We argue that social platforms should
adopt similar approaches to mitigate the spread of inaccurate information
across platforms. Having mechanisms to contextualize the information that
people are exposed to, is especially important when thinking that people decide
to conduct critical offline action based on this information. We invite social-
technical platforms to consider having “watermarks” guidelines to implement
during a crisis to help contextualize all information that is published during a
crisis and help citizens maximize their time and energy in true concerns.
Our micro-level analysis uncovered that people had “backstage” discussions
on how to best present the #19S news and needs that they planned to share.
People wanted to share alarming news reports that might mobilize others to
action. But they also did not want to create a sense of panic. As designers, it
might help to consider tools that help people to collectively “frame” how to
present disaster news.
Our paper also examined how more technical individuals contributed to
earthquake relief efforts by collaborating on Slack and GitHub. These individ-
uals created digital tools that seemed to bridge everyday users and technical
ones. Our micro-level analysis revealed that they wanted to build a culture
of prevention. They were interested in instituting a mentality in which people
with technical backgrounds were willing to assist in rescue efforts during a cri-
sis event. Some of these efforts have started to solidify within the country [24].
Recently, the government launched an initiative to register volunteers that
could help in the case of a crisis event, such as an earthquake. However, from
our investigation, we argue that in order to be successful, these types of initia-
tives should come from independent civic response groups, as we found that
citizens preferred to collaborate with an independent organization. This has
been confirmed in previous work done in Ecuador [80]. This work also found
that individuals across Latin America have a lack of trust in the government,
due to the history of corruption [7].
Our meso-level revealed that they reactivated their activities on Slack when
there was an aftershock from #19S. Future work could use these insights to de-
sign platforms that further encourage this collaboration and facilitate creating
a community, which seemed important to technical folks. Previous research has
found that people with previous connections are more effective during disas-
ters [46]; social media platforms could adapt to allow people to connect with
individuals with similar expertise and social circles to help connect during
rescue efforts.
We believe our findings could be useful to power tools that coordinate
people within different social media platforms, not only for disaster response
but for a range of endeavors, e.g., to counter misinformation in elections.
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8 Limitations
This study confronted some methodological challenges that must be under-
stood to interpret our findings correctly. It has been highlighted before [30]
that activities performed on different social media platforms are challenging to
compare since they operate under different conceptual frameworks and moti-
vations (e.g. retweeting on Twitter vs. mentioning a user on Slack). Therefore,
the insights this work provides are constrained to these limitations.
Our data analysis was constrained by the methodology used to collect the
data. For example, the data from Slack was collected from the group behind
the main website that was reported on in the media. While our data from
Twitter was collected using the hashtags that the news reports mentioned
people were using. The same is the case with our Facebook data, as it was
collected from those groups that had in their name or description one or more
of the #19S related hashtags or keywords related to the earthquake. However,
other hashtags could have been developed organically; if no media reported
about them, it is likely that we missed gathering that data. Therefore, the
quantitative analysis must be viewed from this perspective.
For our interviews, we took care and made an effort to recruit partici-
pants from a range of social media sites. However, our pool of participants
recruited from these sites likely belonged to particular cultural settings. We
tried to counter this issue by triangulating their responses with quantitative
social media data. Future work could focus on an analysis with a more varied
population to overcome sample biases. Additionally, the social media plat-
forms people used to contribute to earthquake relief methods in Mexico might
not generalize to all other disasters. Future work could focus on studying how
multiple platforms are utilized for different disasters across other latitudes.
Notice that it is difficult to track how people jointly used multiple plat-
forms, as people can use different usernames on each site [30]. However, our
quantitative and qualitative analysis allowed us to uncover first how specific
individuals used multiple platforms jointly, in order to then better understand
the patterns we visualized for each social computing platform.
Finally, our understating of information verification process was limited by
our methodology, future work could focus on conducting interviews to Verifi-
cado19S participants to understand their workflow in greater detail.
9 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined social media use in the aftermath of the 7.1-
magnitude earthquake that hit Mexico on September 19 of 2017. We analyzed
the online interactions and collaborations that emerged across multiple plat-
forms in the aftermath of the earthquake. We did a micro-analysis that allowed
us to uncover the different purposes people had for using multiple platforms,
which included building digital tools, mobilizing people offline and verifying
news. We uncovered a citizen-driven approach to fact-check word of mouth
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reports about the situation in the city. We also uncovered how participants
developed their own mechanisms to keep important information useful and
understandable over time and across social networks. We also found that the
groups in which people were posting the most amount of content and were
sharing on social networks, such as Facebook, belonged to categories in which
people were requesting help. Therefore, having a way of sharing reliable in-
formation might have helped to streamline rescue efforts. From our findings,
we conclude that misinformation should be tackled as a cross-platform prob-
lem. This is, the information should stay “relevant” and “trustworthy” while
traveling from one social media platform to another. We also found similar-
ities with work done in the Global South about the reluctance of citizens to
coordinate with the government for rescue efforts, due to the lack of trust in
the government; a problem that has been an issue in the overall region. Our
research suggests how using independent, trustworthy organizations can be an
alternative in these cases.
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